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1This paper reports on the results of Phase II of a project to
develop an Econometric Policy Model of Natural Gas, under National Science
Foundation Grant #GI-34936. The Phase I version is reported in Sloan School
of Management Working Paper #635-72 (December 1972), and the Phase III
version, a Domestic United States Oil and Gas Policy Model, will be com-
pleted by July, 1974. Comments are invited on this interim version.
The results of this project would not have been possible without the
support of our research assistants at M.I.T. We would like to extend our
sincere appreciation to Robert Brooks, Krishna Challa, Ira Gershkoff, Marti
Subrahmanyam and Philip Sussman for their energetic and enthusiastic help
in developing a computerized data base during the summer of 1972, and esti-
mating and simulating the model over the past few months. They worked many
long hours, and often under considerable time pressure. We received con-
siderable support from the National Bureau of Economic Research Computer
Center in the use of the TROLL system for the estimation and simulation of
the model, as well as the maintenance of our data base. We would like to
thank Mark Eisner, Fred Ciarmaglia, Richard Hill, and Jonathan Shane for
their help in using TROLL. We would also like to express our appreciation
to Morris Adelman and Gordon Kaufman of M.I.T., and Robert Fullen and Wade
Sewell of the Federal Power Commission for their comments and suggestions.
Commissioner Nassikas of the F.P.C., Mr. Charles DiBona of the White House
Staff, and staff members of the Senate Commerce Committee were of substantial
assistance in formulating policy alternatives. Finally, more than six dozen
readers of the Phase I version of the model provided critical comments neces-
sary for reformulating the model along the lines presented below. We are
obligated to them all, and absolve them from responsibility for the results
by granting them anonymity.
ABSTRACT
Low wellhead ceiling prices over the past decade have led to the
beginning of a shortage in natural gas production. If the demand for
gas grows as expected during the 1970's, and if ceiling prices remain
low as a result of restrictive regulatory policy, this shortage could
grow significantly. This paper examines the effects of this and alter-
native regulatory policies on gas reserves, production supply, production
demand, and prices over the remainder of this decade. An econometric
model is developed to explain the gas discovery process, reserve accu-
mulation, production out of reserves, pipeline price markup, and whole-
sale demand for production on a disaggregated basis. By simulating this
model under alternative policy assumptions, we find that the gas shortage
can be ameliorated (and after four or five years eliminated) through
phased deregulation of wellhead sales, or through new regulatory rulings,
either of which imply moderate increases in the wellhead price for new con-
tracts. These results are also rather insensitive to alternative forecasts
of such exogenous variables as GNP growth, population growth, and changes
in the prices of alternate fuels.
11.1 Introduction
A substantial shortage of natural gas has been developing over the
last few winter heating seasons. Reports of the Federal Power Commission
indicate that in the winters of 1970 to 1972 gas supplies were cut off with
increasing frequency, and for longer periods of time, throughout the North
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and Eastern portions of the United States. This has been a matter not
only of cutting off supplies in peak periods to industry -- as occurred
in Cleveland in January 1970 when 30,000 employees of 700 companies were
laid off for 10 days as a result of gas interruptions -- but of systematic
curtailments of deliveries to certain classes of consumers. During 1971-
1972, seven major interstate pipelines curtailed service throughout the
winter season to existing customers. Service entering the Northeastern
part of the country from Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation was cur-
tailed 18 percent, from Transcontinental Gas Pipeline 9 percent, and from
Trunkline Gas Company 27 percent. Service throughout the region from New
Mexico to Southern California was curtailed by El Paso Natural Gas Company
by 15 percent. The Federal Power Commission staff has shown deliveries
falling short of the amount of gas demanded for consumption by 3.6% in
1971 and by 5.1% in 1972, and has predicted that production will fall
short of demand by 12.1% by 1975.
1Federal Power Commission, Proceedings on Curtailment of Gas Deliveries of
Interstate Pipelines (1972).
2Federal Power Commission, Bureau of Natural Gas, Natural Gas Supply and
Demand 1971-1990 (1972), p. 123.
2These estimates encompass recent and expected future production
shortages. The amounts do not include anywhere near all of the unsatis-
fied demands for gas. The "markets" for natural gas are not spot markets
for production, but rather center on sales of reserves. The pipeline
buyer offers to take new gas deposits out of the ground, and pays for this
production, so as to deliver gas to residential, commercial and industrial
consumers throughout the United States. The transaction involves the
dedication of reserves by oil and gas discovery companies to pipelines,
and this is followed by a transaction in which the pipelines make commit-
ments to deliver production to final consumers over a ten to twenty year
period. The reserves markets have experienced shortages to a much greater
extent than shown by recent production shortages (according to one estimate,
new reserves have been more than 50 percent short since 1961 ). Also, it
has been estimated that demands for new production by both old and new
potential buyers together exceeded the total supply of new production
available by more than 50%. 2 These unsatisfied demands were never regis-
tered by curtailment proceedings because most of the new potential buyers
did not receive new service from the pipelines. This shortage was realized
The estimate was obtained from a four-equation supply and demand model of
natural gas reserves constructed on the basis of data over the 1950's and
fitted to values of the exogenous variables over the 1960's. The difference
between the fitted values of reserves --those that would clear the market --
and the actual valuesof reserves made available in fuel producing markets
to go to the East Coast and Midwest was more than 50% of fitted reserves
each year from 1961 to 1968. Cf. S. Breyer and P. MacAvoy, "The Natural
Gas Shortage and the Regulation of Natural Gas Producers," Harvard Law
Review, 86: 941-987 (1973), pp. 968-976.
2Cf. Breyer and MacAvoy, op. cit., Table 1, p. 975.
3in additional demands for other fuels with less satisfactory burning and
air polluting characteristics.
Production curtailments have immediate effects on the consumer,
requiring him to use stand-by heating facilities or possibly to do without
heating entirely. The larger shortage of new production contract commit-
ments has more diverse effects. Some consumers are required to go to other
fuels -- with the result that their consumption costs are increased, or that
pollution is greater so that social costs are increased. Other consumers
can work their way around the shortage by changing locations or by offering
various premia to be put at the head of the queue. In general, the economic
and locational effects of the shortage are likely to be significant.1
The political consequences are another matter. The contract sales of
gas at the wellhead and at the city gate are closely regulated by the
Federal Power Commission, so that the F.P.C., the Congress, and the Office
of the President become focal points for complaints that regulatory poli-
cies have either caused or failed to ameliorate the shortages. With neither
producers nor consumers supporting the regulatory process -- neither clearly
benefiting from the shortage -- the possibility of significant political
losses for legislators or regulators is substantial.
1An initial attempt is made in Breyer and MacAvoy to measure the economic
effects of the shortage on consumers. It is argued there that the reserve
shortage is incurred by residential and commercial consumers buying from
regulated interstate pipelines, while industrial consumers buying in unre-
gulated transactions do not experience the shortage to the same extent.
Because of the magnitude of the amounts short in the 1962-1968 period, final
residential and commercial consumers are believed to have been made worse
off as a group from a combination of lower regulated prices and large shor-
tages. Cf. Breyer and MacAvoy, op. cit. No attempt is made here to refine
these estimates with the more advanced econometric model discussed below.
But additional work along these lines -- leading to an assessment of optimal
levels of shortage in terms of economic effects -- will be forthcoming in a
later article.
4Reactions to the potential adverse political effects have been along
two lines. The first has been to call for the loosening of regulation of
contractual agreements at the wellhead. President Nixon in April 1973
called for deregulation of wellhead prices on new contracts; the Chairman
of the Federal Power Commission at the same time argued that "gas supplies
are short ... and the way to encourage more drilling and discoveries may be
to let prices rise."1 Proposals for deregulation are based on the argument
that Federal Power Commission price control procedures have restricted price
increases, while cost increases have
reduced supplies and while there have been large demand increases. Thus,
decontrol would result in higher prices in order to clear the market of
excess demand; but the higher prices would be an inducement to take on
the exploration and development of higher cost reserves -- so as to add
to reserve supply -- and also an inducement for those with the lowest al-
ternative costs to move over to alternative fuels -- so as to reduce total
demands for new reserves.
The second reaction has been to the opposite effect. Proposals have
been made to put in stronger controls over wellhead contracts.
Draft bills proposed by staff of the Senate Interior and Commerce Committees
extend Federal Power Commission jurisdiction to cover not only interstate
sales to pipelines, but all intrastate sales now outside the jurisdiction
of the Federal Power Commission. The requirement that the Federal Power
Commission set "just and reasonable rates" on the basis of historical average
costs of exploration and development is reaffirmed. Proposals are made to
1Cf. "F.P.C. Head Urges End to Gas Curbs," The New York Times, April 11,
1973, p. 19.
5further the development of artificial gas or liquefied natural gas to
replace the short supplies of inground natural gas reserves within the
domestic United States. In effect, prices are held constant and price
controls are extended to encompass all relevant sources of supply and
demand under this policy.
The rationale for strengthened regulation is that, "given the rela-
tively large unsatisfied demand for gas, deregulation of natural gas
prices would lead to massive increases in wellhead prices to abnormally
high levels."1 There would be little increase in supply -- "there is
evidence that gas supplies are relatively inelastic in the short run."
There is also asserted to be some basis for arguing that present regulation
is not the cause for the present shortage. At least, "although cost based
regulation was slow in getting started, it is an adequate method of regu-
lation that has been developed in the 1960's. Many of the uncertainties
have been worked out.... The system of regulation can meet the needs of
the 1970's to elicit the necessary supply of natural gas at the lowest
reasonable price."2
These proposals will be evaluated in this paper. After a more explicit
rendition of alternative policies, the industry into which these policies
are to be introduced is discussed in some detail. Then an econometric
model for policy analysis is described and, finally, the model is used to
evaluate the policy options. The evaluation is in terms of the extent to
1Staff Memorandum to the Chief Counsel, Senate Commerce Committee on
"Proposed Amendments to the Natural Gas Act," (dated April 24, 1973), p. 4.
Senate Commerce Committee Staff Memorandum, op. cit., p. 5.
6which the options ameliorate the shortage -- and at what "cost" in terms
of higher field or wholesale prices of natural gas.
1.2 Three Policy Alternatives
Frequent changes in the size of the gas shortage, and in policies
towards other fuels, bring forth even more frequent changes from Congress
and the Office of the President in proposals for dealing with the gas
shortage. Each of these new policies could be catalogued and evaluated --
but the results would be so specific as to be relevant only to that policy
and the duration of the policy might well be rather short. Alternatively,
the policies can be characterized along two or three dimensions; this is
attempted here, in the expectation that the characterizations will approxi-
mate the many specific alternatives to be considered, accepted or rejected
by the Government in the coming three or four years.
The first alternative policy is that of deregulation of wellhead
prices of natural gas. The Federal Power Commission sets regional limits
on prices for gas dedicated to interstate pipelines; these limits would be
loosened or eliminated in a number of specific policy proposals. In general,
the Federal Power Commission price ceilings would be eliminated only after a
number of years, by taking controls off prices in all new contracts signed
in each year (the time lag in price increases would be extensive, since
most of the flowing gas is under old contracts signed in previous years).
Even these prices would not be free to rise to a level that would clear
7out all the excess demands immediately, since most proposals -- including
President Nixon's Energy Message of April 1973 -- decree that there would
be some national ceiling imposed on new prices in keeping with gradual
elimination of the deficit and with anti-inflationary price controls. The
gradual loosening of price controls is coupled with "short term" rationing
schemes that may involve the extension of regulatory jurisdiction to pre-
sently unregulated companies that are bidding up prices. This "class of
policies" can be evaluated in terms of (a) elimination of price controls
under new contracts, (b) an overall price ceiling in keeping with a 50%
increase in average field price over five years, (c) some regulatory juris-
diction over all field sales by the Federal Power Commission.
The alternative contrasting class of proposals centers on more rather
than less regulation by the Federal Power Commission. Prices would be set
regionally or nationally on the basis of "cost of service." The cost of
service is found by Commission and Court judgment of historical records
on average exploration and development costs in the region. All production
in the region would come under the jurisdiction of the Commission (except
perhaps for the smallest producers who would be exempt to cut down on the
number of case reviews). Production under these conditions would admittedly
be short of demands: holding prices to historical averages essentially
limits reserves or production to amounts equal to or less than historical
levels, and these historical levels were not sufficient to meet demands in
the past. As a result, attention has to be centered on inducements under
regulation for the development of alternative gas supplies, either through
manufacture or import in liquefied form. These alternative supplies would
8be regulated as well. As a result, the second "class of policies" would
(a) set price ceilings close to 1972-1973 price levels, with perhaps a
one cent per annum increase as historical average costs rise slowly with
inflation, (b) all dedications of reserves and production of gas are under
the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission, and (c) manufactured or
liquefied gas is priced under regulation according to the specific cost of
providing these products.
These alternatives are basically contradictory, and it does not seem
likely that amendments could be made to one or the other so as to capture
the loyalty of those supporting the alternative. If neither can be made
politically effective, then the relevant alternative is the status quo
which consists of regulation according to public utility principles at the
Federal Power Commission. The Commission has followed policies in recent
years of allowing field price increases in keeping with "changes in historical
costs" where these "changes" have been defined to be as large as conceivable.
Area ceilings reached by negotiated settlements between producers and con-
sumers have been proposed to the Commission and the Commission has found
them to be "reasonable ceiling prices" not outside the range of possible
average costs.l Comparisons with costs could be made in the near future
that would justify higher future prices, if the Commission so willed --
comparisons of cost on the most recent contracts for sale of intrastate
(unregulated) gas, rather than of interstate (regulated) gas sold over the
last few years. The Commission, in the 1971-1973 period, allowed prices on
new contracts to increase on average by five cents per thousand cubic feet,
Cf. Southern Louisiana Area Rate Proceeding, 46 FPC 86 (1971). Cf. also
Hugeton-Anadarko Area Rate Proceeding, 44 FPC 761 (1970).
9after having held prices constant over the 1960's; the regulator can
continue to find estimates of historical average costs that would allow
further price increases so as to alleviate shortages. But there are
limits to the extent of price increases in keeping with some estimate of
costs. Thus, the third "class of policies" that can be characterized as
maintaining the status quo includes (a) prices that increase from two to
four cents per Mcf in each of the next five years, including one cent per
annum price increases in keeping with general cost increases, (b) limited
regulatory jurisdiction over intrastate sales, and (c) manufactured or
liquefied gas would have regulated price ceilings in keeping with their
respective costs of service.
2. Characteristics of an Economic Model of Natural Gas Reserves and
Production
Our goal in building and simulating an economic model of natural gas
markets with explicit policy controls is to predict and analyze the effects
of alternative regulatory policies. The model is to provide a vehicle for
performing simulations into the future using different policy options,
so as to indicate the effects of the options on the levels of prices and
the size of the shortages. Thus, its formulation stresses prices, reserve
quantities, production quantities, and associated demands for production.
The model, which will be described in more detail in the next section,
treats simultaneously the field market for reserves (gas producers dedi-
cating new reserves to pipeline companies at the wellhead price) and the
wholesale market for production (pipeline companies selling gas to public
utilities and industrial consumers). The linking of these two markets is
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an important characteristic of the natural gas industry. Delivery in the
wholesale market is a determinant of pipelines' demands for gas reserves in
the field market, and the price on new reserve contracts in the field mar-
ket is a determinant of pipeline delivery costs and thus wholesale delivered
prices.
2.1 Field Markets
These markets are the locus of transactions between oil and gas pro-
ducers having volumes of newly discovered
reserves and pipeline buyers seeking to obtain by contract the right to
take production from these reserves. The determinants of the amount of
reserves committed by the oil and gas companies include first the geophy-
sical characteristics of inground deposits of oil and gas. Additions to
reserves come about from additions in (1) gas associated with newly dis-
covered or developed oil reserves, and (2) "dry" gas volumes found in
reservoirs not containing oil; both result from (a) new discoveries, and
(b) extensions of previous discoveries, or (c) revisions of earlier esti-
mates of previous discoveries. The amounts actually in place in the producing
reservoirs limit the amounts of both associated and non-associated new gas
reserves that can be "supplied" or dedicated to the pipelines.
There are important economic determinants of the amount of reserves
available for commitment, and these include prices of new contracts signed
by producers, expected future prices under possibly forthcoming new contracts
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in subsequent years, and changes in average and marginal costs of exploration
and development. These factors are widely believed to have substantial ef-
fects upon reserve availability, although with considerable lag time. Com-
mitments today to higher prices for new contract volumes might lead to
immediate increased planning activities for further exploratory or develop-
mental work; this might lead in a year or two to additional drilling activity
and, with a subsequent year or two, to the offering of additional reserves
for sale to pipeline buyers.
Needless to say, there is a finite amount of gas under the ground
that can be discovered, and thus we might begin to observe a depletion
effect over the coming years. It is not our objective to predict how
much gas there actually is remaining to be discovered, or when this finite
resource will be depleted. Any economic model of the gas industry should
at least take this depletion effect into account; we will do this by ex-
trapolating the decreasing returns that occurred over the past decade.
The demands for new reserves in the field market are manifest in the
willingness to buy of pipeline companies and local (direct)
consumers. They seek to obtain long term contracts for the
extraction of these reserves. Demand determinants in the field
markets include the wellhead price that pipelines and others are willing to
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pay for additions to their reserve holdings, the amount of reserves available
at a specific location, the location of these reserves, and the final
demands for new production by the buyers repurchasing the gas from the
pipelines. These demands would be "registered" in the market only so long
as there is not regulatory price control which sets regional field prices
below those at which total demands are equal to the supplies available of
new reserves. After 1961, when ceiling prices were put into effect, the
demand variable becomes the exogenous F.P.C.-determined price, since it
was lower than the price that would have equilibrated markets.
Production of gas into the pipelines is limited by the amount of
reserves available but, within limits, is determined by the needs of the
pipeline for final consumer delivery. Production cannot take place at
rates greater than 20 percent of installed reserves per annum because of
the impermeability of sandstone contained in the reservoirs and because
faster rates may reduce the economic value of the remaining reserves. Thus, for
both technical and economic reasons, the supply of production out of reserves
will be less the lower is the volume of reserves and the lower is the price in t!
contract commitment. But within these limits, the amount actually taken
on a day by day basis can be determined by pipeline buyers seeking to meet
their ultimate contract commitments to provide on draft for home consumption.
These characteristics of field markets are found in many "futures"
markets in which raw materials are dedicated for production and refining.
The differences between this and other markets are that (1) more will be
made available for sale if the buyers offer higher prices (in rough approxi-
mation to the competitive "supplyt' mechanism), (2) the lag adjustment process
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bringing forth additional supplies of reserves is likely to be long and
possibly quite complex, (3) demands depend on prices, but are also derived
from final residential, industrial and commercial consumption, and (4) pro-
duction out of reserves is determined by a combination of technical and
economic circumstances, but is likely to be greater the larger the volume
of reserves available and the higher the contract prices pipelines are paying
for the gas they are taking.
2.2 Wholesale Markets
Pipelines provide gas deliveries, usually under long term contract,
to industrial consumers taking gas right off the line and to retail public
utility companies for resale to industrial, residential and commercial
consumers. The amounts of gas demanded by direct (mainline) industrial
consumers and retail gas utilities is believed to depend upon the prices
for wholesale gas contracts, the prices for alternative fuels consumed by
final buyers, and economy-wide variables that determine the overall size
of energy markets. If the consumers are industrial companies seeking gas
as boiler fuel or process material, the "market size" variables relate to
the demands for these companies' outputs and to their investment in capa-
city to burn fuel or utilize energy. If the final consumers are households
and commercial building owners, then the "market size" variables relate to
total population and income.
Wholesale markets also operate with lags. Changes in wholesale prices
quoted by pipeline sellers of gas production feed through as changes in
final consumer prices and then feed back as changes in final consumer de-
mand quantities; the feedback may take some time because of consumers'
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commitment to gas burning equipment and the necessity for that equipment
to wear out before demands are reduced. As a result, the effects of price
changes may be fekt only in reduced demands for more gas in subsequent years.
The amount of production provided to industrial and public utility
buyers is not determined by a fixed "supply schedule" of quantities at
various prices. The pipelines offer a specific
amount of additional production at a markup over the field purchase price
for the reserves backing up that production. The price markups are deter-
mined by the cost of transmission and add-on profits limited by Federal
Power Commission regulation (following orthodox public utility procedures
of finding cost of capital by taking a "fair return" on "fair value" of
original investment outlay for pipeline equipment). This procedure is
used because the wholesale market is not competitive -- there are one to
four sources of transmission capacity in any wholesale buying region --
so that there is no explicit supply function at the wholesale level.
Markup pricing has been formulated to build in significant lags from
changes in field contracts. The Commission has followed the policy of
allowing wholesale prices to include the markup for historical average
costs plus profit for the pipelines and historical average field price for
gas at the wellhead. This "rolled-in" price at wholesale is thus changed
by an increased field price only to the extent that the new price changes
the historical average of all field prices. The full impact of a 10 percent
1The effects of rolling in a "one-shot" price increase on new contracts in
1973 can be spelled out in detail. In 1973, the wholesale price is just
the wellhead ceiling price Pc plus the pipelines' markup MCt. In 1974,
[continued on page 15]
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field price change on wholesale prices would occur only after that change
had been in effect for roughly five years (assuming 20 percent of contracts
in each year are new contracts).
There is considerable simultaneity in the behavior of production,
reserves and prices in field and wholesale markets. Field prices determine
the availability of new reserves and the production conditions under new
contracts simultaneously. Changes in field prices are reflected, albeit
slowly, in changing wholesale prices and demands for quantities of produc-
tion at wholesale. This two-level industry can thus be modeled by simul-
taneous equations estimates of production and prices as they depend upon
reserves and conditions in the final markets for energy.
2.3 The Behavior of Gas Markets When There are Shortages
The behavior of this "mixed" set of markets -- some of which exhibit
competitive characteristics of supply while others follow oligopolistic
market patterns -- may be rather complex when there are significant excess
demands for production. Structural equations, defined to delineate behavioral
after the ceiling price on new contracts has been raised to P, the whole-
sale price to buyers of new contracts would not be Pc+MCt, but would instead
be given by:
PW1974 = P + MCt +Q (P' - P)
9W 4 P + c1974 c
where 6Q/Q is the proportion of "new" production to total production. In
1975, the wholesale price would be given by:
6Q1975
1 9 7 5 c t + Q1 9 75-6Q1 9 74 c P ) 
and in 1976, it would be given by:
6Q1976PW1976 = p+ MC + (P
1976 c t 1976-6Q1975c c
The wholesale price would continue to rise until 6Q/-Z6Q)reached a value
of 1; at that point, prices would be fully "rolled in."
16
patterns, are discussed in some detail later, but for now let us examine
how shortages resulting from regulatory policy move through the different
layers of transactions for gas reserves and production.
In the field market for natural gas, proved reserves are incremented
through the discovery process and depleted through production. The amount
of additions to reserves is positively related to some extent to the field
price of gas contracts being signed at the locations close to where that
volume of new reserves is available. The demands for new reserves by pipe-
lines could be specified in terms of field prices, but under conditions of
shortage, the regulated ceiling price P prevails rather than the market
demand price P*. This is illustrated in Figure 1. Under conditions of
shortage, the quantity data fall on the supply but not on the demand func-
tion, with the result that the demand function is not observable. At the
same time, production out of reserves is affected by the reserve shortage.
The supply curve for gas production consists of a marginal development
cost curve which represents the cost of incrementing gas production (by
running existing gas development wells at higher capacity or by drilling
new development wells). The demands for gas production consist of the
schedule of wholesale consumption draughts on the pipeline systems at prices
equal to field prices plus the pipeline markups necessary to get the gas
from the wellhead to wholesale buyers. These final demands may still be
met at the beginning of the reserve shortage, as a result of the pipelines
calling on existing reserves to produce at a higher rate.
Sufficient production under a condition of reserve depletion cannot
be had indefinitely. Eventually, the amount of reserves available to back
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production is reduced, and supply of production at ceiling prices is re-
duced. As the reserve backing becomes smaller, marginal development costs
will increase, so that in the presence of fixed ceiling prices, production
will tend to fall and a gap is opened between the demands for production
and the supplies that will be made available.
The marginal cost curves, the price markup, and a wholesale demand
curve for new contracts, are all shown in Figure 2. In this diagram, the
ceiling price is sufficient to bring forth production Q* which clears the
market at wholesale price P*, which is just the field price plus the
pipeline's markup. Under these conditions, the demand curve for produc-
tion is "registered in the market" or observable as a total quantity
demanded with specific price level. However, if the regulated field price
is reduced to a level P', excess demand will result equal to (Q1-Q0). The
supply of production is reduced by price disincentives to a level below
the demands put on the pipeline system by retail gas utility companies
serving final residential, industrial and commercial consumers. There are
shortages both in field reserve and final production markets.
How would an increase in the ceiling price feed through these markets
so as to reduce the production shortage? Consider, for example, an increase
in wellhead ceiling prices under Federal Power Commission regulation. When
the ceiling price is increased, the production cost curve remains fixed ini-
tially, since reserve levels would not change immediately and therefore
marginal production costs would not change. The higher price, however,
would eventually elicit more production out of given reserves Q' and also
reduce demands for production from Q1 to Q (as shown in Figure 3). Thus,
pp*
P
C
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even within the short run, excess demand would be decreased by a price
change from (Ql-QO) to (Qi-Q) even though the change may not be substan-
tial because the "roll-in" pricing practices of the Commission would
dampen the demand effect.
After two or three years, however, it is likely that reserve levels
will have been increased as a result of the higher level of new contract
prices. Higher ceiling prices would stimulate more exploratory drilling
which, in turn, should result in new discoveries of gas that add to reserve
levels. At that point in time, a given level of production could be induced
at lower marginal development costs because of the presence of higher reserve
levels. The supply of production curve would have shifted to the right.
Even if demand were to remain at Q;, an increase in supply to Q would re-
duce the extent of the shortage. After a few more years, the full effects
of the ceiling price increase would have occurred, with the supply of pro-
duction shifting further to the right so that excess demand had fallen to
the even lower level of (Q-Q"')l
Of course, if we could increase the ceiling price just the right amount,
accounting for resulting future shifts in the supply curve and independent
shifts in the demand curve (resulting from increased population, national
income, etc. as shown by D1 9 7 7), we might reach a situation where there was
no excess demand in 1977. This is shown in Figure 4. Note, however, that
until 1977, there will still be some amount of excess demand -- in the first
1This analysis assumes that the pipeline markup is constant with respect to
the level of production and that the difference between (P + price markup)
and (P' + price markup) is equivalent to the "roll-in" price increase allowed
under regulation. The econometric model discussed later deals with these
matters of detail in specific price markup equations.
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year after the price increase, for example, excess demand will be (Q1-Q0);
not until 1977, when the supply curve, demand curve, and price line all
intersect at the same point, would there be a level of production, Q*,
that results in no excess demand.
What if the field price of all gas were immediately and completely
deregulated? This would result in a wholesale price increase to the level
P* which, when the regulated markup is added on, would clear the production
market immediately (as shown in Figure 5; the supplies and demands for pro-
duction are both equal in one year to Q*). This substantial price increase
would not be the end of the story, however. After three or four years, the
supply curve will have shifted to the right, again because increased explo-
ration and discoveries in response to the price increase would have added
substantially to the reserve base. The demand curve would perhaps also
have shifted to the right after three or four years, but the net result would
probably be a decrease in price and further increase in quantity of produc-
tion over the four year period. This is illustrated in Figure 5 where the
1973 equilibrium quantity Q* is increased over time to Q** as the equilibrium
field price P* falls to P**
f f
These examples indicate that pricing policies have a three or four
step effect upon the size of the shortage, and it may take several years
before the full effects of a price change become apparent. The econometric
model presented in the next section allows us to analyze the dynamic impact
of alternative price ceiling changes quantitatively.
23
¢/Mcf
S1973 S1977
D1 97
Figure 5
.up
Q
lp
qo q q---- ql
24
3. An Econometric Model for Policy Analysis
Most previous econometric studies of natural gas have investigated
either demand or supply of gas, but have neglected the simultaneous inter-
action of these two sides of markets. Balestra, for example, in his
classic study of the demand for natural gas by residential and commercial
consumers, assumed a perfectly elastic supply curve for production. This
assumption was probably justified during the 1950's and 1960's since pro-
duction of gas for final consumers took place on an "as needed" basis from
large stocks of reserves, but it would not continue to be valid during the
1970's, however, as total gas demand exceeds the constraints on production
imposed by smaller reserve levels. The supply studies of Erickson and
Spann, and Khazzoom, similarly, are admirable attempts at defining and
testing some of the relationships that exist in the gas industry, particu-
larly those accounting for reduced reserve levels under price controls. But,
to the extent that policies are changed in the future so that markets clear,
and demand is once again observed, models of only the supply side of
markets will be inadequate to represent the effects of policy. If the
industry is to be properly understood, then, production and reserve
supply levels of the industry have to be analyzed as a simultaneous system.
The model developed as part of this study consists of a set of simul-
taneous econometric relationships among several policy-related variables.
Variables endogenous to the field market include, on the supply side, non-
associated and (oil) associated discoveries of gas reserves, extensions and
revisions of associated and non-associated reserves, and wells drilled.
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These variables directly or indirectly depend on the field prices paid by
pipelines in new contracts for gas. Field prices would be endogenous if
demands could clear, but after ceiling prices were set by the F.P.C. in the
1960's, this variable became an exogenous policy variable.
Endogenous variables in the wholesale market include demand for pro-
duction of gas and wholesale prices for three wholesale delivery sectors:
mainline industrial sales, sales for resale that are ultimately industrial,
and sales for resale that are ultimately residential and commercial.
Throughout the 1960's, wholesale production demand was completely satisfied
even though there was excess demand for reserves (of course, reserve-
production ratios dropped dramatically during the decade) and thus wholesale
demand equations can be estimated from data generated in this period.
An equation for marginal development costs (the "supply curve" for
production in field markets), when combined with pipeline wholesale price
markup equations, provide the wholesale supply curves for production. This
allows us to determine "production out of reserves," as well as possible
excess demand by comparing estimated "production out of reserves" with
estimated demands for reserves.
There is no single field market, nor is there a single wholesale market
in the United States. Producers from around the country do not take their
gas to the Chicago Board of Trade in order to make offers of sale to pipe-
lines. Rather, there are several "regional" field markets and several
"regional" wholesale markets, and the natural gas industry is characterized
by the spatial interrelationships of these markets. This is taken into
account by our econometric model. Field reserve and production equations
are estimated for supply regions either separately or together with specific
variables to account for the regionalization. Wholesale demand equations
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are estimated for each of five parts of the country (each part roughly
representing a regional market). Gas from each production district in
the country is allocated to one or more wholesale consumption regions
using the average allocation proportions that prevailed in the past
(based on the presumption that many new pipelines will not be built during
the 1970's). In this way, excess demand can be computed on a region-by-
region basis, as well as for the country as a whole.
3.1 Structure of the Model
The organization of the model is illustrated in Figure 6. Note,
however, that this figure leaves out (for simplicity) the spatial inter-
connections between production districts and regional wholesale markets.
In the model as it actually runs, the wholesale prices of gas (for mainline
sales and for sales for resale) are computed for each region of the country
by taking the wellhead price of gas at the production source and adding a
markup based on pipeline mileage and volumetric capacity. When a wholesale
consumption region is supplied by more than one production district (as is
usually the case), wellhead prices, mileages, and capacities are weighted
according to previous actual proportions of production from each district.
Let us now look at the individual parts of the model in more detail.
A. The Field Market
Probably the sector of the natural gas industry most difficult to
capture in a conceptual model is the supply of new reserves. Most of the
current controversy over regulatory policy centers on this sector -- whether
or not reserve additions have been too low as a result of past regulatory
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policy. Actual additions to reserves through new discoveries are realized
by a complicated process involving a large number of technological factors,
and it may seem naive to try to model the process using a set of simple
econometric relationships. Structural equations can be formulated, however,
that do link economic and technological variables that are important in gas
reserve additions and also describe most simply and directly the regulatory
effects.
The major component of new reserve additions consists of new discoveries
of both non-associated and associated gas (non-associated gas (N) is dry gas
while associated gas (A) includes "dissolved" gas recovered from oil produc-
tion, as well as "free" natural gas forming a cap in contact with crude oil).
In our model, the discovery process begins with the drilling of wells, some
of which will be successful in discovering gas, some will be successful in
discovering oil (with associated gas), and some will be unsuccessful (i.e.,
dry holes). The drilling of wells depends largely on economic incentives;
in our model, it is dependent upon past revenues from oil and gas production,
average drilling costs, and a measure of drilling risk.
The model translates drilling activity into actual discoveries through
two size-of-discovery variables, one for non-associated and one for asso-
ciated gas. The size of discovery variable for non-associated gas, for
example, gives for any district and any year the average number of Mcf of
gas discovered per well drilled. The size of discovery variables themselves
are explained partly by economic variables (e.g., oil and gas prices and
drilling costs) but also by a depletion effect, in which extensive well
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drilling in the past (measured by cumulative wells drilled) makes it more
difficult to discover gas in the present.
Drilling may be divided into two basic modes of behavior, depending on
whether it is done extensively or intensively. In extensive drilling, few
wells are drilled, but those that are drilled usually go out beyond the
frontier of recent discoveries to open up new geographical locations or
previously neglected deeper strata at old locations. Typically, this would
include drilling farther offshore, or onshore but at very great depth.
Here the probability of discovering gas is rather small, but the size of
discovery may be comparatively large. When drilling is done intensively,
many small wells are drilled in an area that has already proven itself to
be a source for gas discovery. Here the probability of discovering gas is
larger, but the size of discovery is likely to be very small. In Figure 7,
typical probability distributions for discovery size are shown for each
mode of drilling behavior. Relative to the intensive drilling mode,
discovery size for extensive drilling has a larger expected value but
also a larger variance.
The producer who is engaged in exploratory activity has, at any point
in time, a choice as to whether any increases in his drilling activity will
be extensive or intensive, and this choice will be influenced by changes
(or expected changes) in economic variables. The actual influence of
economic variables (field prices and drilling costs) will depend on the
producer's geological portfolio (i.e., the set of regions over which he
1See F.M. Fisher, Supply and Costs in the U.S. Petroleum Industry.
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Figure 7: Discovery Distribution
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has drilling rights), as well as his own translation of present and past
prices and costs into expectations on future prices and costs. Suppose,
for example, that drilling costs decrease. As a result, a producer might
decide to accept greater risk and drill on the extensive margin, with the
result that average discovery size will (ex post) increase. On the other
hand, the producer may own partially drilled reservoirs that now are worth
drilling out. If this is the case, he might decide to drill on the inten-
sive margin with a resulting ex post decrease in average discovery size.
Thus it is not possible a priori to determine whether the effect of a
decrease in drilling costs on average discovery size will be positive or
negative. The same is true for a change in the price of gas.
Higher gas prices should indeed result in more drilling, but we would
expect that over the years success ratios and size of finds will decrease
as our finite resource stock begins to get depleted. One may model the
exploration and discovery process stochastically as sampling with-
out replacement, so that the expected value of discovery size would decrease
as the sampling process went on. It is not our objective to try and pre-
dict how big the total stock of gas yet to be discovered is, but we would
like to embody a "depletion effect" in our model, at least to the point of
being able to extrapolate the long-run decreasing returns to industry size that
See G. Kaufman, "Sampling without Replacement and Proportional to Random
Size," Memorandum II, March 19, 1973.
2Industry spokesmen have claimed that higher gas prices result not only in
more drilling activity, but also a shift to the extensive mode resulting in
larger discovery size. While we would expect higher gas prices to elicit
more drilling, it is not clear that the additional drilling will be more
extensive. Our results do show a positive relationship between price and
discovery size, but with a low elasticity.
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have occurred over the past decade. We do this by including cumulative wells
drilled as an explanatory variable in our "size of discovery" equations. If
the level of drilling activity is the same next year as it is this year, we
would expect to see the level of new discoveries drop somewhat, and this is
what would indeed happen if discovery size depends negatively on cumulative
wells drilled.
Additions to gas reserves can also occur as a result of extensions and
revisions of existing fields and pools. Extensions and revisions should also
be expected to depend on price incentives, past discoveries of gas, existing
reserve levels, and the cumulative effect of past drilling. Extensions are
somewhat easier to model than revisions, and actually turn out to be influenced
by price incentives, prior discoveries, and the total level of drilling acti-
vity.l Revisions of established reserve levels are often erratic and difficult
to predict. There is some effect from the price of oil relative to gas, but
otherwise revisions will simply turn out to be proportional to prior disco-
veries and reserve levels.
New discoveries, (DN, DA), extensions (XN, XA) and revisions (RN, RA)
are combined to form additions to reserves. Aside from losses (L) and
changes in underground storage (AUS), which we model as a constant percen-
tage of production, the only major subtraction from reserves occurs as a
result of production (Q). Thus, for any time t, in a production district j,
total gas reserves are given by the identity:
Rt,j = Rtl j + DNt,j + XNt j + RN t + DA + XA + RAtj t-l,j t,j t,j tj tj tj t,j
- Q t,j t,j - AUSt,j
We see that the supply of new reserves is determined by adding new
discoveries, extensions and revisions together and subtracting production
1Extensions can result from either exploratory or development well drilling.
Our model does not explain development well drilling, and therefore only
exploratory wells are used to explain extensions.
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(and also, of course, adjusting for losses and changes in underground
storage). If the wellhead price of gas were not regulated, or if regula-
tion were ineffective, then the demand for new reserves could be given by
an equation for pipeline offers to buy reserve commitments at specified new
contract wellhead prices. Since 1962, however, there has been excess demand
for new reserves and thus the demand function for new reserves has not been
observable. Instead, the price has been given by the exogenous ceiling price.
B. Production Out of Reserves
The supply of production as a function of price is just the
marginal cost (in the short term) of developing existing reserves (e.g.,
drilling development wells and then operating them) to the point of actual
gas production. Clearly, marginal production costs will depend on reserve
levels relative to production, and as the reserve-to-production ratio
becomes small, we would expect marginal costs to rise sharply.
Let us examine what marginal costs would be corresponding to a pro-
duction level q out of proved reserves R. Assuming a constant decline
rate, a, in percent per year,
a = q/R = /Reserve-Production ratio , (2)
we can write the proved reserve level as
R = q f e tdt = q/a .(3)
Then for a discount rate 6 the "present-Mcf-equivalent" (PME) of a constant
production level q is:
lOur thanks to M. Adelman and M. Baughman for their assistance on this
part of the model.
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PME = q 0f e(a+)t dt = q/(a+6) (4)
Now we assume that the development investment, I, needed to obtain the
production level q is given by:
I = A + ce aq (5)
where A is a start-up cost, c is constant over the range of zero well inter-
ference, and is a parameter with value around 10. Thus, when a is small
(e.g., the reserve-production ratio is larger than 10), I will be roughly
linear in q, but when a becomes larger (e.g., the reserve-production ratio
approaches 5), an exponential rise in costs begins to predominate. The
marginal development cost (MDC) is then given by:
dI dI . dq
d(PME) dq d(PME)
DI da + I dq (6)
(a dq aq d(PME)
MDC = ( eaq + cea) (a+6) 2
~a (a+6)2
= (a + l)ce 6
2
= (a + l)cS6ea (1+ . (7)
This marginal cost curve is illustrated in Figure 8 for 6 = 0.1,
8 = 10, c = 10, and R = 0.2 trillion Mcf. For small values of a (i.e.,
large reserve-production ratios), the curve is predominantly quadratic,
and when a becomes large, the curve begins to look more like an exponential.
We estimate a marginal cost curve (which, when price is set equal to
marginal cost, becomes our supply curve for production out of reserves)
that is essentially exponential. Aside from the fact that this gives a
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better fit to recent data, it is also in keeping with our goal of calculating
excess demand for gas under conditions of declining reserve-production ratios.
MDC (¢)
q (billion Mcf)
10 20 30 40
Figure 8: Hypothetical Marginal Cost Curve
C. The Wholesale Market
The supply of production -- determined by what is essentially a
marginal cost curve for production out of reserves -- has to be put against
demands for that production by companies providing gas to final consumers.
The demands for production are approximated by curves fitted on a disaggregated
basis, namely by wholesale demand equations for (1) gas sales for resale
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(split into commercial-residential gas, and industrial gas on the basis of
percentages distributed to these two groups for ultimate consumption),
(2) gas sales directly off the pipelines for consumption, and (3) intrastate
sales by producers and pipelines to final consumers. The wholesale prices
of gas (disaggregated into a "sales for resale" price and a "mainline sales"
price) is computed by adding a markup to the field price based on (a) the
mileage between the production district and the consuming region, and (b) the
volumetric capacity-of the pipelines.
The demand equations follow a general formulation, in which the quantity
demanded is dependent on wholesale price, the price of alternative fuels,
and "market size" variables such as population, income, and investment that
determine the number of potential consumers. In all of the equations, the
dependent variable will be new demand, 6Q, rather than the level of total
demand. In the short run, as Balestra has shown for residential gas [2],
the level of total demand should be relatively price inelastic and would
depend on stock variables that do not change much in time (e.g., the total
stock of gas burning appliances for residential gas). New demand, however,
should respond to the price of gas and to the price of competing fuels
(decisions to buy new appliances, for example, are affected by fuel prices).
The new demand for gas, 6Q, is made up of the increment in gas consumption
AQ = Qt-Qt-l' and of replacement for continuation of old consumption. To
find replacement, total residential and commercial gas demand could be
considered to be a function of the stock of gas burning appliances, A:
Qt = AtQt t
(8)
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where X is the (constant) utilization rate. Then, if r is the average rate
at which the stock of appliances depreciated, the replacement demand for gas
includes rAt 1, and total new demand is
6Qt = AQ + rAt_l ' (9)
Now substituting (8) into (9) gives:
6Qt = AQt + rQt-l . (10)
Thus, new demand for gas is the sum of the incremental change in total gas
consumption (AQt ) plus the demand resulting from the replacement of old
appliances.
Our a priori assumption is that new demand depends on prices and total
income (through purchases of new appliances), and that the level of total
demand is itself a function of income and population. Thus, we have for
residential and commercial demand:
6QSRCRt,k = f(PSRt,k PFt,kYt,kk'Yt,k 6Nt,k ) (11)
where PSR is the sales-for-resale wholesale price, PF is a price index of
competing fuels, Y is disposable income, and N is population, all in
region k, and
6Yt,k = AYt,k + rYt-l,k (12)
and
6N A +rN 1(13)t,k = Nt,k rNt-l,k(13)
1Balestra [2] distinguishes between two depreciation rates, one for gas ap-
pliances and the other for alternative fuel-burning appliances, since life-
times for appliances using alternative fuels may be different. He then
estimates the two depreciation rates by estimating an equation of the form:
QSRCRt = a0 + aPSRt + a2ANt aN + a3N t_1 + a4A Y t + a 6QSRCRt_-. (14)
[continued on next page]
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The model is closed by spatially interconnecting production districts
with consuming regions. A flow network is constructed which, based on rela-
tive flows over the past few years, determines where each consuming region
obtains its gas. Average wholesale prices (again both for sales for resale
and mainline sales) can thus be computed for each consumption region in the
country, since mileages and volumetric capacities are then determined.
Wholesale demand (by type) is then also computed for each region of the
country. Wholesale demands can be summed to produce total demand for each
region of the country, and since we know what the supply of production will
be to each region of the country, we can determine excess demand.
3.2 Estimation of the Model
The model was estimated using pooled cross-section and time-series data.
The time bounds of the regressions are different for different equations,
partly as a result of data limitations but also because of structural change
over time in the industry. Wholesale demand equations, for example, were
estimated using data only from 1967 to 1971, even though data was available
from as far back as 1960, because it was felt that demand elasticities have
The depreciation rate for gas appliances is then given by (l-a6). (His
results, however, gave an estimated a6 that was always greater than 1, which
cannot be justified theoretically.) The all-fuel depreciation rate comes
out of equation (14) as either the ratio a3/a2 or a5/a4. Thus, the equation
is over-identified, and the depreciation rate can be obtained only by esti-
mating (14) subject to the constraint of a3/a2 = a5/a4. (The resulting
estimation problem is non-linear, but Balestra uses an iterative method
suggested by Houthakker and Taylor [12] to obtain an estimated depreciation
rate equal to 0.11.) Rather than attempting to estimate one or more depre-
ciation rates, we will use a single rate assumed to be equal to 0.1, and use
this for both industrial and for residential and commercial demand.
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changed considerably during the 1960's partly as a result of new air
pollution standards.l
Cross sections were also different for different equations. Field
market equations were estimated by pooling data from all of 19 F.P.C. pro-
duction districts, while individual sales-for-resale wholesale demand
equations were estimated over what were considered to be the proper re-
gional wholesale markets, and thus each used data pooled from five to ten
states. District breakdowns and time bounds are summarized for all equa-
tions of the model in Table 1.
A. Statistical Results
The regression results described below were obtained using two-
stage least squares whenever unlagged endogenous variables appeared on the
right-hand side of an equation. All of the equations are linear in form,
with the exception of the equation describing production out of reserves,
which is logarithmic in the price term (thus marginal production costs are
an exponential function of production and reserves). t-statistics are
shown in parentheses below each estimated coefficient. Also listed for
each equation are the R, F-statistic, standard error of the equation,
Durbin-Watson statistic, and the mean of the dependent variable. Note
that the Durbin-Watson has limited meaning, since error terms may be auto-
correlated across time and/or across cross-sections, and these effects are
not separated.
1A test of this hypothesis and a more detailed study of demand will appear
in a future paper.
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One of the difficulties in constructing a model of this sort is that
one must work under the constraints imposed by data limitations. Data for
many variables is either difficult or else impossible to obtain, particularly
for years prior to 1966. In addition, much of the data is extremely noisy.
As a result, a good deal of compromise was often required in estimating
equations between functional forms that are theoretically pleasing and those
that lend themselves to the existing data. This should be kept in mind when
interpreting the estimation results.
A.1 Field Market Equations
The field market portion of the model contains seven stochastic
equations that explain total exploratory well drilling (WXT), non-associated
and associated average discovery size (SIZEDN, SIZEDA), extensions (XN, XA),
and revisions (RN, RA). Non-associated and associated new discoveries
(DN, DA) can be determined from the two identities:
DNt = SIZEDNt j WXTtj (15)
DAt,j = SIZEDAt j ' WXTt j (16)
and the supply of new reserves is then determined from the identity in
equation (1).
Exploratory well drilling responds to three economic incentives, all
of which are exogenous to the model. The first of these is total revenues
(deflated by a GNP price index), REVD, from sales of both oil and gas at
the wellhead. Exploratory drilling may result in the discovery of either
gas or oil, and so total revenues is used as an explanatory variable. Note
that changes in the price of gas (or the price of oil) can affect drilling
activity through this revenue variable.
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Average total drilling costs (also in deflated terms), ATCD, is a
second explanatory variable; rising costs are expected to have a negative
impact on drilling. The third explanatory variable, RISKV, provides a
measure of relative risk between different regions. It is a purely cross-
sectional variable that does not change in time, and is the sample
variance (measured over recent years) of payoff size in each district.
Finally, three dummy variables are introduced (DDA, DDB, DDC) to account
for heterogeneity among four broadly defined regional field markets in the
United States. The estimated equation is:
WXT = 385.03 + 818.54 DDA + 188.22 DDB + 152.62 DDC + 2.31x10 4 REVD
(8.60) (3.23) (1.10) (3.37) (2.30) t-
- .00398 ATCD 1 - 2.087 RISKV (17)
(-4.08) (-2.75)
R = .466 F = 16.12 S.E.- 201.5 DW = 0.31 Mean(WXT) = 356.04
Here it can be seen that "cash flow" (as measured by REVD ) has a positive
effect on drilling, while costs and risk have negative effects. All three
effects are statistically significant. Thus, drilling increases as lagged
prices and finds increase and as lagged costs and risk decrease.
Economic variables influencing the size of non-associated discoveries per well
include the wellhead price of gas, PG, and average drilling costs per foot,
ATC/AFX. As explained earlier, the signs of these variables cannot be pre-
dicted a priori. A third explanatory variable is the cumulative number of
wells drilled, CWXT. This is expected to have a negative impact on discovery
size since it represents a depletion effect. Finally, the lagged dependent
variable is added to the equation, as well as the three district dummy
variables. The final equation is:
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SIZEDN = -634.59 + 1370.7 DDA + 627.65 DDB + 613.08 DDC + 34.66 PG
(-1.69) (3.42) (1.70) (3.87) (1.96) t1
+ 14.88 ATC -l/AFXt- - 0.060 CWXTt 1 + 0.390 SIZEDNtl
(1.05) (-1.36) (5.38)
633 F = 22.9 S.E.= 580.1 DW = 1.30 Mean(SIZEDN) =
(18)
705.8.
The equation explaining the size of associated discoveries has the same
form, except that the price of oil, PO, is used instead of the price of gas,
and average drilling costs are not computed on a per foot basis:
SIZEDA = 38.34 + 115.08 DDA + 35.11 DDB + 26.30 DDC - 9.37 PO +
(1.40) (2.99) (1.78) (3.23) (-1.21)
-4
+ 1.198x10 ATC - .0041 CWXT + 0.2655 SIZEDA
(0.95) t-l (-1.69) t-l (2.88)
731 F = 36.2 S.E.= 31.87 DW = 1.83 Mean(SIZI
(19)
EDA) = 42.46.
These two reserves equations together show strong lag effects (in the
coefficient of SIZEDNt_ ), cost effects, and depletion effects (although the
coefficient of depletion is not statistically significant). The price effects
are in opposite directions. The price of gas has a strong positive effect on
size of non-associated discoveries while the price of oil has a negative (but
insignificant) effect on the size of associated discoveries. These effects
can occur in this combination because of aggregation of intensive and exten-
sive drilling across districts; their net impact on discoveries, however, is
likely to increase discoveries as prices increase.
Extensions of non-associated gas depend on the ratio of gas to oil prices
(relatively higher gas prices are a stimulus to extend gas rather than oil fields
and total exploratory drilling. Exploratory drilling is used as a proxy for
total exploratory and development drilling; extensions also result from the dril-
ling of development wells, but this variable is not explained by the model. The
2R=
2R
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equation also includes district dummy variables to account for the signifi-
cant cross-sectional heterogeneity.
XN = -5.086x105 + 1.435x106 DDA + 3.142x106 DDB + 1.732x105 DDC +
(-1.43) (5.89) (10.95) (1.45)
+ 521.02 WXT + 77251.0 PRATIOt_ (20)
(2.36) (1.32)
2 5 5
R .648 F = 44.9 S.E.= 5.85x10 DW= 0.62 Mean(XN) = 4.22x105
The equation for extensions of associated gas is similar in form,
except that associated discoveries replaces non-associated discoveries,
and the ratio of the price of gas to the price of oil is included as an
explanatory variable that results in price-responsive directionality in
drilling.
XA = 36480 + 0.946 DA 1 + 9.459 CWXT - 7611 PRATIO + 0.409 XA (21)
(0.71) (3.63) (1.69) (-0.90) (5.07)
2 4 4
R .565 F= 33.13 S.E.= 8.89x104 DW= 2.47 Mean(XA) = 5.81x104
Revisions of non-associated gas (RN) depend positively on the previous
year's total reserves of gas (YT), and negatively on the change in the
previous year's reserves of gas. Large short run increases in reserves
usually limit revisions in the following year (which apply more to estab-
lished discoveries), but in the long run a higher level of reserves results
in a higher average level of revisions.
RN = -35903 + .0062 YT - .0242 AYTt 1 + 0.368 RN (22)
(-0.64) (2.12) (-4.66) (5.28)
R2= .348 F= 20.49 S.E.= 4.80x105 DW= 1.70 Mean(RN) = 0.69x105
Note that the coefficient of the autoregressive term (RNt 1) is about 0.37,
and thus the long run impact on revisions resulting from an increase in re-
reserves of 1 Mcf is approximately equal to:
1 .37 (.0062) = .01 Mcf
since there is no long run effect from the AYTt 1 term. Thus, a one Mcf
increase in the stock of reserves implies about a .01 Mcf per year increase
in the flow of non-associated revisions.
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Associated revisions (RA) are extremely erratic and difficult to
explain using a simple linear regression model. There seems to be no rela-
tionship between this variable and lagged reserves of gas, mostly because
associated revisions are linked more closely to oil reserves (which are not
explained in this model). We modeled associated revisions by relating it
to the previous year's associated discoveries and associated
extensions, and the gas-to-oil price ratio, although the relationship is
somewhat dubious:
RA = 2.178x105 + 3.185 DA + 0.450 XA - 42319 PRATIO (23)
(0.95) (2.67) t1 (1.28) (-1.1)
R2 = .186 F= 7.85 S.E.= 4.06x10 DW= 1.32 Mean(RA)= 0.70x10
A.2 Production Out of Reserves
Two equations are estimated to predict the supply of produc-
tion out of reserves, one for Louisiana South, and another for the remainder
of the U.S. South Louisiana is a large producing region with cost charac-
teristics somewhat different from the rest of the country, and is therefore
treated separately. Although data was available from 1955 to 1971, the
nation-wide production equation was estimated using only data from 1965 to
1971, since it was only in these years that production approached full short
term capacity. The South Louisiana equation, however, is estimated over
the range 1962 to 1971 in order to have a sufficient number of degrees of
freedom (only one production district is involved, and so there are only as
many data points as there are years).
In both equations, total production Q is regressed against the log of
the wellhead price PG and against total reserves YT. This yields a supply
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of production equation of the form:
alQ-aY2t,j
PGt j = cOe (24)
with aO, al, and a2 all positive. This approximates (for reserve-production
ratios less than 10) the marginal cost curve of equation (7). The nation-
wide equation also contains two regional dummy variables, one for the Permian
region (DDB) and the second for the region including Oklahoma, Kansas, and
Texas Railroad Commission Districts 2, 3, and 4 (DDC). These dummy variables
help account for district heterogeneity that remains even after South Loui-
siana is excluded from the sample.
The estimated equations are shown below:
United States, excluding South Louisiana (1965-1971):
Q = -5.053x105 + 1.823x106 DDB + 5.879x105 DDC + 2.4755x105 log(PG)
(-1.30) (16.10) (7.43) (1.85)
+ 0.0240 YT (25)
(5.57)
R2= .838 F= 122.5 S.E.= 2.59x10 Mean(Q) = 8.117x10
South Louisiana (1962-1971):
Q = -4.663x107 + 1.0465x107 log(PG) + 0.2576 YT (26)
(-11.25) (9.16) (8.45)
2 5 6
R = .964 F= 79.7 S.E.= 4.53x10 Mean(Q) = 4.941x10
Both of these equations show positive and significant effects of prices and
total reserves. Thus, with higher prices, both short and long run production
should increase (as in Figures 5 and 8).
A.3 Wholesale Price Markups
We assume that as long as pipelines are operating within their
capacity, marginal transmission costs are a constant function of mileage Mk
and volumetric capacity Vk of the lines transmitting to region k. The whole-
sale price equations thus have the simple form:
1This mean pertains to an average district, since we are pooling cross-
section and time series data.
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PSRt,k - PGt,k = f(Mt,kVt,k) (27)
for price on "sales for resale" to retail gas utilities and
PMt,k - PGt,k = f(Mt,kVt,k ) (28)
for price on "mainline" sales to industrial buyers. Here, PGt k is the "roll-
in" wellhead price for wholesale region k determined by averaging the wellhead
prices from flowing production in those regions which feed pipelines that
transmit gas to region k. The mileage variable Mt k and the capacity variable
Vt,k are similarly defined, i.e., in terms of the average values of these
variables from production regions to the wholesale market region k. The
"markup" is the excess of the price over field costs allowed by competition
and the Commission, but as shown by the size of coefficients of the indepen-
dent variables in marginal transmission costs. The "determined" price is
approximated by the regression equation coefficients.
Both of the explanatory variables M and V have been roughly constant
in time over the past decade or two, so that we are actually running cross-
section regressions resulting in constant markups. For sales for resale,
the wholesale price is given by:
-4
PSR = PG + 12.561 + 0.712 M - 3.3185x10l V (29)
(18.28) (18.66) (-10.57)
R 2= .561 F = 356.2 S.E. = 5.823 DW = 2.25
Note that the coefficient of volumetric capacity V is negative, since a
larger capacity implies lower average costs. For mainline sales, our markup
equation is given by:
PM = PG + 3.080 + 1.079 M (30)
(4.80) (18.29)
R = .739 F = 334.6 S.E. = 3.04 DW = 1.90
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The capacity variable was found to be statistically insignificant, and
therefore was not included in this equation.
A.4 Wholesale Demand for Gas
Wholesale demand is broken into three major categories:
sales-for-resale demand, mainline sales demand, and intrastate demand.
Sales-for-resale demand is further broken down into gas that ultimately is
resold for residential/commercial consumption and gas for industrial consump-
tion, and for each category separate equations are estimated for each of
five regions of the country. Mainline sales (which are assumed to be mostly
industrial) is determined by two equations, the first estimated by pooling
data from gas-producing states, and the second estimated using data from non-
producing states. The reason for this separation is that in gas-producing
states interstate mainline sales compete with intrastate mainline sales, and
as a result demand elasticities will differ from those in non-producing
states. Intrastate sales are explained with a single equation by assuming
that all intrastate sales are the same as mainline industrial sales, so that
the mainline wholesale price PM is an explanatory variable.
New or additional demand 6Q = AQ + rQtl is used as the dependent
variable in all equations. We have chosen a single depreciation rate r equal
to 0.1, based on the assumption that gas-burning equipment has an average life-
time of ten years. Explanatory variables besides the price of gas include the
wholesale price of oil (POIL), income (Y), population (N), value added in manu-
facturing (VAM), capital investment by industry (K), and a price index of
alternate fuels (PALT).
Sales-for-resale demand equations are presented for each market region
below. In the South Central and Southeast regions, residential/commercial
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and industrial sales are aggregated together. Prices have been very low
and demand has fluctuated considerably in these regions, making it diffi-
cult to obtain stable estimates of demand elasticities on a disaggregated
basis. All equations are estimated over the time bounds 1967-1970.
Northeast - Residential/Commercial
6QSRCR = -11501.4 + 2.885 6Y + 27101.2 POIL + 0.3667 6QSRCRt_
(-0.89) (2.47) (1.58) (3.29)
525 F = 10.3 S.E.= 1.94x104 Mean(6QSRCR) = 3.13x104
Northeast - Industrial
6QSRI = 56682.4 - 1.3724x105 PSR + 1.5336 VAM + 0.1852 6QSRIt
(3.27) (-3.24) (4.21) (1.55)
628 F = 15.7 S.E.= 1.28x10 Mean(6QSRI) = 2.16x104
(31)
(32)
North Central - Residential/Commercial
6QSRCR = 65927.4 - 2.656x105 PSR + 13.417 6
(2.24) (-3.20) (11.09)
2 4
R = .822 F = 49.3 S.E.= 1.60x10
North Central - Industrial
6QSRI = 29858.7 - 1.752x105 PSR + 55241.4 P
(0.96) (-1.94) (1.42)
2 4
R .769 F = 25.8 S.E.= 1.70x10
West - Residential/Commercial
6QSRCR = 5542.3 - 2.446x104 PSR + 37.79 6N
(0.72) (-0.99) (17.41)
2 S.E.= 8.65x103
R .891 F = 151.3 S.E.= 8.65xl0
West - Industrial
6QSRI = 8737.0 - 4.069x10 PSR + 87.52 K
(0.54) (-0.78) (13.95)
2= .840 F = 97.3 S.E.= 1.82x
R = .840 F = 97.3 S.E.= .82x10
Y + 41268.7 POIL
(1.19)
Mean(6QSRCR) = 3.52x104
(33)
OIL + 1.765 VAM + 0.6450 6QSRI
(2.74) (4.44)
Mean(6QSRI) = 3.47x104 (34)
(35)
Mean(6QSRCR) = 12.18x103
(36)
Mean(6QSRI) = 1.93x104
2
R
2R-
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South Central - Total
6QSRT = 4535.3 + 10.06 K + 0.461 6QSRTt_1
(1.92) (1.99) (2.94)
2 4
R = .383 F = 12.1 S.E.= 1.04x10 Meal
Southeast - Total
6QSRT = 23206.8 - 4.161x104 PSR + 0.727 QSRT 1
(2.03) (-1.46) (4.53)
12.0 S.E.= 1.01x104
R .490 F = 12.0 S.E.= l.01xlO Mea
(37)
n(6QSRT) = 1.30x104
(38)
n(6QSRT) = 2.89x104
Mainline industrial demand equations are shown below, estimated
separately for gas-producing and non-producing states.
Mainline
6QM = 86703.0
7.21)
754 F =
Sales - Producing Regions
- 3.869x105 PM + 1.205x105 PALT
(-7.28) (6.32)
29.2 S.E.= 1.2x104 ]
(39)
Mean(6QM) = 3.0x104
6QM =
438
Mainline Sales - Non-Producing Regions
30050.5 - 1.155x105 PM + 7.357x104 PALT
(1.68) (-2.65) (3.07)
F = 12.9 S.E.= 8.76x10 
(40)
Mean(6QM) = 12.13x103
Finally, an intrastate demand equation has been estimated as follows:
6QINTRA = 2.614x105
(2.92)
R = .494 F = 7.81
- 1.137x106 PM + 1.822x10 POIL + 117.85 K
(-3.28) (1.63) (3.65)
S.E.- 1.06x105 Mean(6QINTRA) = 1.02x105
These equations show negative price effects on demands, in all regions except
the Northeast (where gas prices are probably too high) and the South Central
(where gas prices are too low). Alternative fuel prices are important in
determining mainline industrial sales. Size of market variables, such as
consumer incomes or industrial investment or output, do not appear to be
consistent causal factors in all sectors of the national gas market.
2= .
R=
2R=
(41)
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B. Interregional Flows of Gas
In order to calculate estimates of excess demand by consuming
region (and under-production by production district), we must have some
estimate of how gas flows from the wellhead to the point of final con-
sumption. We do this at an aggregate level using the demand regions W,
NE, NC, SE, SC and production regions, P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8,
as defined below:
W: West - Arizona, California, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Wyoming,
Nevada, Utah, Colorado, New Mexico
NE: Northeast - New England, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Ohio, West Virginia, Kentucky, Maryland (and Delaware), Virginia
NC: North Central - South Dakota, Nebraska, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri,
Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, Indiana
SE: Southeast - Tennessee, Alabama, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, Florida
SC: South Central - Kansas, Texas, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Louisiana,
Mississippi
P1: Texas Railroad District 10, Oklahoma, Kansas
P2: New Mexico San Juan, New Mexico Permian, Texas 8, Texas 8A, Texas 7C
P3: Texas 1, Texas 9, Texas 5, Texas 7C
P4: Texas 2, Texas 3, Texas 4, Texas 6, Louisiana North, Louisiana South,
Mississippi
P5: Colorado, Wyoming
P6: Canada (exogenous production)
P7: California
P8: Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, West Virginia
The flows of gas from production region to consuming region as estimated
for 1970 are shown in Figure 9. In each box is an integer which represents
the flow from the particular production region (row) to the consuming region
(column). The decimal to the left of this number (fjk) represents the fraction
of the consuming region's demand which comes from that production region, while
the decimal to the right (k) represents the fraction of gas from that pro-
duction district going to a particular consuming region. Then, letting Qj
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Figure 9: Gas Flows - 1970
Sales
f g;i
W NE NC SE SC
Total
Production
235 82 1765 0 2136 4218
P1 .069 .055 .020 .019 .413 .418 .000 .000 .247 .506 .192
1675 0 646 0 955 3276
P2 .497 .512 .000 .000 .151 .197 .000 .000 .110 .292 .149
0 14 60 14 237 325
P3 .000 .000 .003 .043 .014 .184 .009 .043 .027 .729 .014
0 3630 1776 1530 5293 12,229
P4 .000 .000 .888 .296 .416 .145 .990 .125 .607 .428 .558
478 0 20 0 0 498
P5 .141 .959 .000 .000 .004 .400 .000 .000 .000 .000 .022
305 0 0 0 0 305
P6 .090 1.00 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .013
676 0 0 0 0 676
P7 .200 1.00 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .030
0 359 0 0 0 359
P8 .000 .000 .087 1.00 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .016
3369 4085 4267 1544 8621 21,886
Total
Demand .153 .186 .194 .070 .393 1.000
~~~~~~~~~~~~. ...0_
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equal production in district j and letting Dk equal demand in region k, we
can calculate:
(1) Q - [fjkDk] = production shortage in producing region 
j k 
and
(2) Dk - [Qjgjk] = excess demand in consumption region k
The numbers in Figure 8 were derived from F.P.C. data as follows:
(1) The F.P.C. Sales by Producers of Natural Gas to Interstate Pipeline
Companies 1970 was used to determine for each company the distribution
of sales from each production region.
(2) These purchases were then distributed to the various consuming regions
(if they went to more than one) by an estimation process based on the
F.P.C. Form 2 Reports on Sales for Resale and Mainline Industrial Sales
by interstate pipeline companies and through the use of the F.P.C. map,
Principal Natural Gas Pipelines in the United States 1968. In many in-
stances the companies purchases and sales were divided into several non-
overlapping flows. These were then easy to determine. In others, it was
necessary to estimate the actual flows since more than one production
region might be tapped for sales to more than one consuming region along
the same pipeline. In these cases, judicious use of the Form 2 data was
necessary to resolve the data. It is believed that the estimates made
are close enough to the correct ones to make estimates of excess demand
within the accuracy desired.
(3) The third step was to determine the size of intrastate and field sales1
1Field sales are sales to an oil producer for pressuring purposes. It also
includes pipeline fuel.
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to each region. This was done by determining the difference between
the total interstate sales coming from each production region and the
value given for total production from that region by the AGA's Reserves
of Crude Oil. The difference was then added as intrastate and field
sales to the demand region containing the production region. In only
one case (Permian Basin) was it necessary to split the intrastate pro-
duction into two demand regions. This was accomplished by using the
Bureau of Mines Consumption of Natural Gas data (Bureau of Mines, Minerals
Yearbook) for 1970 and previous to determine total consumption for New
Mexico. The quantity of intrastate sales necessary to bring New Mexico's
total consumption up to the proper level was added into the proper box.
The rest was added to the South Central region.
This completed the flow table from which the fractions were easily calculated.
3.3 Simulation of the Model
The model will be used to predict the response over time of production
supply and demand to a changing regulated field price. In order to help in-
terpret (and also evaluate) these predictions, it is useful to examine a
simulation of the model performed over an historic time period. If, for
example, this simulation showed an increasingly upward bias in production
supply over time, this could be taken into account when interpreting the
model's predictions for future excess demand.
The model was simulated over the period 1965-1971, using historical
values for all of the exogenous variables, including regional wellhead prices.
1This time period represents the intersection of time periods for which data
is available for each variable in the model.
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The results of this simulation are shown for production supply and demand
and for the wholesale price in Table 2. In addition to listing the simu-
lated values, actual values, and errors for each variable, the mean and
root-mean-square (RMS) simulation errors are also calculated.
Note that simulated production supply is about 4 trillion cubic feet
larger than the actual production levels between 1966 and 1969 (the mean
error is less than 3 trillion cubic feet, but that is because the 1965 error
is negative). Production demand is also overestimated, with an error that
grows from about 1 trillion cubic feet in 1966 to about 2.5 trillion cubic
feet in 1970. Although the mean demand error is smaller than that for supply,
the demand error is growing at a rate that would make it equal to the supply
error by 1972 or 1973. At least part of the reason for the overestimate of
demand is the underestimate of the average wholesale price. The simulated
wholesale price is about one penny too low from 1965 to 1969, and two pennies
too low in 1970.
It would appear, then, that the model's forecasts of excess demand should
be viewed as having a margin of error (probably negative) of at least one or
two trillion cubic feet. This should be taken into account when interpreting
the policy analyses that are presented in the next section. Excess demand
may turn out to be somewhat larger than what we forecast, and the price in-
creases necessary to eliminate excess demand may actually be a few cents
higher than those which we present.
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4. Simulation of Policy Alternatives with the Econometric Model
With long lags from price changes to exploration, development and
production changes, it might be expected that very little additional supply
would be forthcoming in the next five years from increased field prices.
Given "roll in" pricing in wholesale markets, field price increases
would be passed through very gradually as wholesale price increases.
As a result, there might be only limited reductions in demand as
a result of the price increases, as well. These possibilities
can be investigated by completing several simulations with the model
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using alternative policies (in so far as these policies are reflected in
alternative field prices), where the model has been set up to roughly
approximate the conditions likely to be prevalent in the late 1970's.
The "gas economy" of the last half of the 1970's can be described
in any number of ways, varying from quite expansive (due to shifts of
energy demands to natural gas) to quite restrictive (due to reduced prices
for alternative fuels as new coal-using technology is developed and vastly
increased supplies of oil resources become available). The expansive view,
when introduced into the econometric model, would result in large increases
of demands, while the more restrictive expectations would have quite the
opposite effect. When these conditions are replicated in the model, by
introduction of appropriate values of exogenous variables, the size of the
shortage becomes either larger or smaller. The approach taken here is to
not choose an extreme set of values of the exogenous variables to be in-
serted into the model; rather, we choose a set of values that follows from
"median" conditions likely to prevail in energy markets in the near future.
The important exogenous determinants of demands for gas include state-
by-state value added in manufacturing, population level, income, and capital
equipment additions. It is forecast that value added, income per capita, and
capital additions will grow at 4.2 percent per annum (based on the Data
Resources Quarterly Econometric Model forecast for the period 1972-1980).
These rates of growth are in terms of constant dollars; we have chosen a
"median" expected rate of growth of prices close to 3.5 percent per annum
(based on both the Thurow-Ripley Long Term Econometric Model of Data Resources
and the DRI Quarterly Econometric Model). Thus, value added and capacity
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grow at 7.7 percent in current dollar terms. Population growth is much
more modest; it is assumed that the rate of growth will be limited to 1.1
percent per annum for the rest of the decade (in keeping with the assump-
tions used in the economy-wide models for generating the rates of growth
of value added and capacity).
Other exogenous variables that are determinants of the share of total
energy markets that will be realized by natural gas are: (1) wholesale
prices of alternative fuels in residential and commercial consumption, and
(2) wholesale prices of alternative fuels for industrial use. Both are
expected to increase at zero percent per annum in real terms and 3.5 percent
per annum in current dollar terms. These are the forecasts in the National
Petroleum Council's United States Energy Outlook and are the mid-points in
a wide range of alternative simulations of production and demand conditions
in petroleum and other fossil fuel markets.
Exogenous determinants of supply of reserves and production include
the field price for crude oil in the producing regions, and the average
drilling costs for oil and gas together. It is expected that oil prices
will increase at no more than the rate of change of the price level (3.5
percent per annum); this too is based on the National Petroleum Council's
United States Energy Outlook (pp. 40 et seq.). Average drilling costs are
expected to increase at 5.75 percent per annum, in keeping with the trend
of cost increases over the 1960's and early 1970's.
These values of the exogenous variables, together with assumed percen-
tage increases of gas prices on new field contracts, can be inserted into
the econometric model to produce simulated values of additions to reserves
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and production by field region. Also, the results of simulation include
demands for new production and for total production, and average wholesale
prices for different classes of consumers in each of six wholesale markets.
Each of the alternative regulatory policies implies a different series of
field prices; separate simulations for each price series can be described
and then compared with those for other policies.
4.1 Deregulation of Wellhead Prices
A large number of alternative proposals have been made under the
rubric of "deregulation of field prices." These have included complete
and instantaneous deregulation on the one hand, and a slightly higher
rate of increase of F.P.C.-controlled prices on the other hand. But the
central proposal is probably to allow new contract prices to seek their
own levels, subject to a national ceiling on all new prices that would
keep average wholesale prices from increasing by more than 50 percent over
the subsequent five year period. This policy has been simulated as a price
increase of 10 cents per Mcf on all new contracts in 1973 over a 25.2 cent
per Mcf price level on new contracts in 1972. Prices would
increase an additional one cent per year after 1973, as part of the market
response to rising drilling and operating costs.
The impact of the price increaseson new discoveries of reserves would
not occur in 1973, but rather would be spread over the period 1974-1977.
It is expected that 1973 new discoveries would be slightly more than 18
trillion cubic feet -- only 1 trillion cubic feet greater than the previous
year (as shown in Table 3, for the econometric model simulation for
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"Deregulation"). But, by 1976, new discoveries would increase to the
level of 26 trillion cubic feet and by 1979 would be 28 trillion cubic
feet. Total additions to reserves (including new discoveries, extensions
and revisions) would track new discoveries rather closely. A major part
of the impact of price increases would be felt within four years, as an
increase in annual additions 10 trillion cubic feet greater than pre-
viously experienced. The full impact would not be felt, however, until
1980, when total additions had leveled off at 42 trillion cubic feet, an
amount approximately 14 trillion cubic feet greater than the 28 trillion
realized before the 10 cent price increase.
Production out of reserves can be expected to increase for two
reasons. First, the new contract field price increases of 10 cents or
more per Mcf would make it more profitable to increase the level of devel-
opment of existing reserves. Second, the additions to total new reserves
induced by price increases provide more "reserve base" for more pro-
duction. As a result, the supply of production would be expected to increase
from 21 trillion cubic feet in 1972 to 31 trillion cubic feet by 1980. The
combination of the larger reserve base and more production will keep the
reserve-production ratio between 10/1 and 11/1 -- price increases provide
additional incentives to take out a larger proportion of reserves, while
also providing additional reserves, so that the two effects cancel out in
the reserve-production ratio.
The demand side of gas markets experiences attrition as a result of
the pass-through as the higher new contract field prices are passed along
to the wholesale level. The wholesale prices do not increase very rapidly.
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Because of the large number of old contracts still outstanding at the end
of the 1980's, the average wholesale price at that point in time barely
reaches the new contract field price level. But these prices rise on
average from the 30 cent level in the early 1970's to 42 cents by 1980,
and the increases have some effect on demands. The demands for production
by residential, commercial, and industrial users throughout the country
rise from 22 trillion cubic feet in the early 1970's to 31 trillion cubic
feet by 1980, even with price increases, because of increased investment,
consumer incomes, and population. In the absence of the field and whole-
sale price increases, demands would have increased from 22 trillion cubic
feet to 40 trillion cubic feet.1 Therefore, as a result of approximately
50 percent increase in wholesale prices spread over a 10 year period, total
demands for production are decreased by 25 percent (from 40 to slightly
more than 30 trillion cubic feet by 1980), and additions to demands are
decreased by 50 percent (from 20 trillion to 10 trillion cubic feet).
The results of this policy of "partial deregulation" are to raise
prices and greatly reduce the magnitude of the gas shortage. Price in-
creases, while substantial, eliminate the production shortage after five
years, so that by 1977, the supply of production and the demand for produc-
tion are both approximately 28 trillion cubic feet at a reserve-production
ratio close to 11/1. In subsequent years, supplies again match demands
rather closely, but the reserve-production ratio does not increase. The
production shortage is ameliorated, but the reserves margin over production
remains low throughout the 1970's.
This estimate has been made by simulating with the same values of exogenous
variables but with zero field price increase after 1973.
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It might be asked whether the market clearing in these simulation
results is highly sensitive to the choice of particular values of the
exogenous variables. This would not seem to be the case. Simulations
were also carried out with "high" and "low" sets of values of the exoge-
nous variables; the "high" values included real rates of growth of value
added, income, and plant and equipment outlay of 4.4 percent per annum,
of population of 1.3 percent per annum, and real price increases for al-
ternative fuels of 1.3 percent (residential and commercial use) and 3.0
percent (industrial use). These additions were matched by oil field price
increases of 4 percent per annum in real terms. The rate of inflation was
maintained at 3.5 percent per year. The result would be expected to in-
crease demands for gas substantially -- but also to increase supplies of
both oil and gas (particularly associated gas reserves). The simulation
with "high" values of the exogenous variables shows, in fact, additions
to reserves 5 trillion cubic feet greater than the 42 trillion cubic feet
for 1980 in the "median" case in Table 3. Production out of reserves is
expected to exceed 32 trillion cubic feet, because of the additional volumes
of new discoveries available. Demands for reserves in this "high" value
case exceed 34 trillion cubic feet so that there is a shortage of approxi-
mately 1.3 trillion cubic feet in production in 1980.
"Low" values of the exogenous variables would be quite similar to the
"median" values, except that value added and per capita incomes would in-
crease one percent less per annum, and both field and wholesale prices of
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alternative fuels would decline slightly. In this simulation, the low
values of field prices for oil dampen incentives for exploration of
(associated) gas, so that annual new reserves by 1980 are approximately
0.5 trillion cubic feet less than shown in Table 3. The supply of pro-
duction out of reserves is also 0.5 trillion cubic feet less, but demands
for production are dampened from 31 trillion cubic feet in 1980 to 28
trillion cubic feet, so that more than enough production is supplied to
meet demands over the period 1976-1980. Reserve-production ratios in
this case are allowed to go up slightly from the 11/1 level. Altogether,
the size of the shortage ranges from one trillion cubic feet in the "high"
value case to -2 trillion cubic feet in the "low" value case.
The impression is that "deregulation" that results in field prices
in the 35 to 42 cent range over the rest of the decade would clear pro-
duction markets of excess demand. There is some chance that there would
still be a shortage as large as 8 percent, if "high" values of exogenous
variables increased demands for gas more than reserves and production.
But the most likely values of exogenous variables, and even the "low"
values, would clear production markets, with low reserve backing the only
indicator of a gas shortage.2
1The expected rates of decline are 4.6 percent for field prices of alternate
fuels, 0.2 percent for wholesale prices of alternate fuels for residential and
commercial use, and 0.3 percent for wholesale prices of alternate fuels for
industrial use. These are in keeping with the National Petroleum Council's
United States Energy Outlook (December 1972), pp. 40 et seq. It is assumed
that prices would increase at 3.5 percent per annum in money terms, in the
"low" value case as well as the "median" and "high" value cases for simulation.
2In fact, it is difficult to say whether a reserve-production ratio of 10 or
11 represents a reserve shortage. Although there may be demands for higher
ratios at these prices, they cannot easily be registered (and prices allowed
to rise to meet these demands).
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4.2 Strict "Cost of Service" Regulation of Field Prices
One criticism of the regulatory "status quo" is that prices have been
allowed to creep up at the rate of 1.5 cents per annum on new contracts,
when there has been little "cost justification" for this to occur. It is
argued that the Federal Power Commission should follow traditional proce-
dures for setting prices -- that is, full reviews of the cost of providing
gas should be undertaken and prices should be limited to these costs. It
is expected that under this regimen, price increases under new contracts
would be limited to one cent per annum. This would result in average
wholesale prices limited to the 30 to 36 cent range over the 1970's (as
shown in Table 4).
The effects of such limited price increases on reserve and production
supply would be substantial. New discoveries would increase by less than
one trillion cubic feet per year for the remainder of this decade, and
total additions to reserves would be limited to 30 to 35 trillion cubic
feet per year. The supply of production out of reserves would range from
23 trillion cubic feet in 1974 to slightly less than 28 trillion cubic feet
in 1980. Altogether, additions to reserves are approximately 3 trillion
cubic feet less per year than under the "deregulation" policy shown in
Table 3.
The demand for production would be much greater when prices are held
within this range. Total demand for new production increases by 1.5 to
1.8 trillion cubic feet per annum (as shown in Table 4). Total new demands
by 1980 are expected to be more than 36 trillion cubic feet, 5 trillion
cubic feet greater than under price increases associated with "deregulation."
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Excess demands persist over the remainder of the decade. Indeed,
the gap between supply and demand for production increases as time passes,
from approximately 4 trillion cubic feet in 1974 to 9 trillion cubic feet
by 1980. The impact of this "cost of service regulation" policy is to
exacerbate the excess demands that already exist, so that the shortage
would be more than 30 percent of the supply of production by 1980.
These conditions can be expected whether the "median" values, the
"high" values, or the "low" values of the exogenous variables are used in
the simulations. When "high" values are used, the size of excess demand
exceeds 10 trillion cubic feet per year, because additions to demands from
market growth and price incentives exceed additions to (associated) supply
from oil price increases. When "low" values are used, the excess demand is
limited to 6.8 trillion cubic feet per year. But, in all three cases, the
shortage increases over the remainder of the decade, and is equal to 20
percent or more of the available supply of production out of reserves.
4.3 Maintenance of the Regulatory "Status Quo"
Continuation of regulation is envisioned as a maintenance of the
1970-1971 policy of allowing price increases on new contracts of 2 to 4
cents per Mcf each year. The cases on field pricing brought before the
Commission for the rest of the decade would be decided on any number of cost
or other bases, but the result would be a price series for new commitments
of reserves as shown in Table 5 -- with annual increments of approximately
3 cents per Mcf per year leading to prices in 1980 of more than 50 cents
per Mcf. Such price changes would not be easy to put into effect -- each
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requiring multiple applications for certification of new contracts under
conditions different from the previous year's certification, each re-
quiring some conceivable set of estimates of the (increased) cost of pro-
viding the new contract production at successively higher prices. But
these increases, if allowed by a commission trying to reduce the shortage,
would raise average wholesale prices from 30 cents to 45 cents by 1980,
and would have a perceptible effect on both supplies of reserves and pro-
duction, and demands for production.
Supplies of reserves are expected to increase at a faster rate under
these conditions than under "deregulation." The increments of new dis-
coveries and total additions to reserves are shown in Table 5; they exceed
those for Table 3 by 4 to 5 trillion cubic feet at the end of the decade.
The supply of production out of reserves is almost 2 trillion cubic feet
greater as a consequence. The combination of successive 3 cent increments
leading to a higher final price, and of near-certainty of the occurrence
of these increments, lead to substantial additions to both reserves and
production.
Demands for production, on the other hand, are approximately the same
as under "deregulation." The successive increments of new contract field
price increases pass through as average wholesale price increases only
gradually. Even though the new contract field price is approximately 9
cents per Mcf higher in 1980 under the "regulatory status quo" than under
"deregulation," average wholesale prices are close to 45 cents under regu-
lation and 43 cents under deregulation. As a result, demand for production
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increases from 21 trillion cubic feet in 1970 to 30 trillion cubic feet
in 1980, the same levels and rates of increase as under "deregulation."
The supply-demand balance is achieved under the "status quo" in
1977. In subsequent years, the total supply of production would be from
1 to 3 trillion cubic feet greater than the demand, so that -- rather than
producing excess supply -- further increments would be added to reserves
so as to raise the reserve-production ratio in the early 1980's. This
occurs with approximately the same timing as under "deregulation," but
the increments of supply over and above the demands for production are
larger under the "status quo" than under "deregulation" in 1979-1980.
The use of "high" or "low" values of exogenous variables again does
not affect the outcome of this policy. Markets are cleared of the shortage
under the "status quo" in 1975 using "low" values of exogenous variables,
and in 1978 using "high" values of exogenous variables. The increment by
which supply of production exceeds demands in 1980 equals 1.7 trillion
cubic feet in the "low" simulation and 1.2 trillion cubic feet in the
"high" simulation. In all of the simulations of continued regulation,
policies of the Federal Power Commission that allow 3 cent per annum
price increases eliminate the shortage of production two to four years
after being put into effect.
4.4 Comparisons of Alternative Policies
The policy choices facing the government and the natural gas industry
are numerous and complex, involving combinations of changes by the Legis-
lature and within the independent regulatory commission. But, when policies
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are "polarized" and treated as price level changes, the effects of a wide
range of alternatives on the magnitude of the natural gas shortage are
not remarkably different. The government can "deregulate" by legislative
act and reduce the production shortage to negligible size within four to
five years. The Federal Power Commission can achieve almost the same re-
sult by stretching the standards for justifying price increases so as to
allow increases of 3 cents per annum. A combination of these two policies
would probably have similar effects -- legislative changes that specifi-
cally allow the Federal Power Commission to depart from "cost of service"
regulation with 3 cent annual price increases would reduce the gas shortage.
The pipelines would not support liquid or synthetic gas investments as solutions
to the shortage -- at least not if the costs of these investments were greater
than 45 cents per Mcf. There is little basis to choose between the two
alternatives in terms of eliminating the shortage of gas production, other
than that "deregulation" achieves the shortage elimination with less whole-
sale price increase over the decade.
Both of these alternatives are preferable to strict "cost of service"
regulation. Regulatory stringency is expected to increase the size of
the shortage from approximately 2 trillion cubic feet of production per
year to 9 trillion cubic feet by the end of the decade (as in Table 4).
Synthetic or liquefied gas at more than 45 cents per Mcf would be justifiable
as investments under regulation, because they would alemiorate the shortage.
Given strong political and economic reasons for reducing the shortage, this
way of doing so is the most prolonged and the most costly.
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APPENDIX
List of Variables and Data Sources
The variables used to estimate the model, including sources of data,
are listed below. The list is divided into field market variables and
wholesale market variables. No production or price data is available for
Louisiana Offshore.
Wells
WXT: Total exploratory wells, successful or otherwise.
CWXT: cumulative value of exploratory wells (WXT), from 1963 to t.
REVD: index of average deflated revenue from gas and oil for each
production district.
ATCD: average drilling cost per well of exploratory and development wells,
from Joint Association Survey, (AGA/API/CPA).
RISKV: index of the variance in size of discoveries over time by production
district. This is a pure cross-section variable which doesn't change in time
AFX: average depth of an exploratory well (averaged over total wells)
Reserves: all data from AGA/API/CPA Reserves of Crude Oil. Only available
in disaggregated (i.e., associated-dissolved, non-associated, by
production district) form from 1966 except for year-end reserves
(YN, YA, US) which we have from 1965. Data is given in millions
of cubic feet.
SIZEDN: average size of non-associated discoveries, by production district
(averaged over total wells, dry and successful).
SIZEDA: average size of associated discoveries, by production district
(averaged over total wells, dry and successful).
DDA: Dummy variable for Louisiana south.
DDB: Dummy variable for the Permian producing region.
DDC: Dummy variable for Kansas, Oklahoma, TRRC Districts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 10.
DDD: Dummy variable for Louisiana north, Mississippi, New Mexico north,
Pennsylvania, West Virginia-Kentucky, Wyoming, TRRC6 and TRRC9.
71
YN: Year end non-associated reserves. Reserves as defined by the AGA.
YA: Year end associated-dissolved reserves. See YN.
YT: Year end total gas reserves. YT = YN + YA.
YO: Year end oil reserves.
US: Year end reserves in underground storage other than in their
original locations.
XN: Extensions of non-associated gas. Includes any newly proved reserves
already established in pools and fields.
XA: Extensions of associated-dissolved gas. See XN.
RN: Revisions of non-associated gas. Includes any proved decreases in
size of proved reserves discovered by drilling of extension or develop-
ment wells or changes (+ or -) resulting from better engineering esti-
mates of economically recoverable reserves in established pools.
RA: Revisions of associated-dissolved gas. See RN.
FN: New field discoveries of non-associated gas (discovered by new field
wildcats).
FA: New field discoveries of associated-dissolved gas. See FN.
PN: New pool discoveries of non-associated gas.
PA: New pool discoveries of associated-dissolved gas.
DN: = FN + PN. Total new discoveries, non-associated.
DA: = FA + PA. Total new discoveries, associated-dissolved gas.
Production: All data is from AGA/API/CPA, Reserves of Crude Oil, and is
available in disaggregated form from 1965 for gas (and 1940
for oil). In 106 cubic feet and 10 3 barrels.
QN: Production of non-associated gas, i.e., net production.
QA: Production of associated-dissolved gas, net production.
QO: Production of oil.
QSRI: Sales for resale which will end up as industrial sales are determined
by multiplying total sales for resale (from F.P.C. Form 2 Reports) by
the fraction of total industrial natural gas consumption (from U.S.
Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook).
QSRCR: The difference btween total sales for resale and industrial sales
for resale. (See QSRI for sources.)
QINTRA: The difference between total consumption of natural gas by state
and total mainline sales plus sales for resale plus field sales
in that state. Figures on total consumption by state are taken
from Bureau of Mines Minerals Yearbook, as are total field sales.
Mainline sales and sales for resale figures are from FPC Form 2
reports.
QM: Total mainline industrial sales volume by interstate pipeline companies
by state and year (1955-1970) in Mcf, from FPC Form 2 Reports.
QSR: Total sales for resale volume by class A and B interstate pipeline
companies, by state and year (1956-1970) in Mcf, from FPC Form 2 report
L: Losses and waste, by states (Texas, Louisiana and New Mexico
undivided). From API Petroleum Yearbook.
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Prices:
PG: New contract price of interstate sales of gas at the wellhead, from
Table F FPC, Sales of Natural Gas, for 1952-1971, in ¢/Mcf. (Compiled
Foster Associates Inc.)
PO: Wellhead price of oil in $/barrel for 1954-1971, from Bureau of
Mines, Minerals Yearbook.
POIL: Average price per Mcf-energy-equivalent of fuel oil paid by electric
power companies by state, from Edison Electric Institute, Statistical
Annual of the Electric Utility Industry.
PALT: Price index of alternate fuels. Weighted average (over kilowatt-
hours generated) of prices of fuel oil and coal consumed by electric
utility industry in generating electric power, by state and year
from 1962-1969. (See POIL for source.)
PM: Price of mainline industrial sales made on a firm basis, by state
and year from 1952-1970. Data taken from FPC Form 2 Reports, in
$/Mcf.
PSR: Price of sales for resale in $/Mcf from 1956-1970, by state and
year. Data taken from FPC Form 2 Reports.
PRATIO: = PG/PO.
M: The distance from the center of a producing region to the population
center of the consumption region.
V: The sum of the squares of pipeline diameters entering the state, by
state.
VAM: Value added in manufacturing in millions of dollars by state and
year, from 1958-1969 (interpolated for 1968). Data taken from U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Annual Survey of
Manufacturers.
K: New capital expenditures in millions of dollars; see VAM for source.
VCC: Value of construction contracts by states in which work was done,
from 1956-1970, in millions of dollars. Data taken from Statistical
Abstract of the U.S. and from F.W. Dodge Corporation, Dodge Construc-
tion Contract Statistics Service.
Y: Personal income by state, from 1956-1969, in millions of dollars.
Data taken from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current
Business.
N: Population by state and year, from 1955-1970, in millions. Data
taken from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Current Population Reports.
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